The Emerging Payments Research Group (EPRG) at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston sponsored a new conference, "Consumer Behavior and Payment Choice: How and Why Do Consumers Choose Their Payment Methods?" on October 27-28, 2005, at the Boston Fed. The conference brought together a diverse set of participants from the academic, private, and public sectors. This paper provides a summary and overview of the conference. Key conclusions are that the consumer's decision-making process concerning payment choice is quite complex, that standard economic models have difficulty incorporating this complexity, that additional research-especially interdisciplinary research-into consumer choice of payment method is needed, and that this conference was an important step in that direction.
I. Introduction
These are unusual times in the payments industry. A workhorse traditional payment method-paper check-writing-is heading out to pasture. Paper checks are being replaced by a host of new electronic payment methods emerging from the technological revolution in information processing. Most payments experts have a good handle on why the electronic payment methods are efficient, fast, and convenient. But few payments experts have a good handle on why specific individuals choose the particular payment methods they use.
When the tide (finally) turned on paper check-writing in the late 1990s, most everyone was caught off guard. While many experts expected paper check-writing to go the way of the typewriter and some even hoped and worked for that day, no one really knew when it would come. So the payments industry continued to build, innovate, and improve its paper checkclearing capabilities. But when electronic payment methods finally became popular with the consuming public, the retirement of paper checks came to seem inevitable, while remaining stubbornly unpredictable. As the volume of paper checks declined, the capital and labor infrastructure devoted to paper check-clearing-especially in the Federal Reserve Systembegan to shrink. Now, the race to replace paper checks has begun in earnest. Payment service providers are striving to offer the next "king of the hill" in the payment arena. To do so, they must satisfy the whims and fancies of the American consumers who use these payment methods. At the same time, these consumers are juggling a widening array of payment choices that offer a myriad of characteristics, and not all of these options are well understood. As a result, some of the consumers' observed payment choices may not be the spending and saving plans that are in their best interests.
Public policymakers, such as the Federal Reserve System, have a responsibility to make sense of this pervasive transformation in payment practices. Payments industry participants, both suppliers and users of payment methods, are seeking legal and institutional arrangements that cultivate the best possible payments system. To achieve this lofty goal, policymakers must create an environment that maximizes the efficiency of the new electronic-based payment services and the well-being of the ultimate users of payment methods. Payments experts seem to have a much better-although by no means perfect-handle on the proper public policies for creating a low-cost system to providers of payment services than on the policies that would ensure maximum benefits to the end-users of payments (consumers) too.
The Emerging Payments Research Group (EPRG) at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston recognizes the significant gap in our understanding of the demand side of the payments market. One of EPRG's central goals is to promote fundamental research on consumer payment behavior, in order to inform the development of optimal public policies toward the payments system. As one of its first official acts, EPRG sponsored a conference, "Consumer Behavior and Payment Choice: How and Why Do Consumers Choose Their Payment Methods?" on October [27] [28] 2005 , at the Boston Fed. This paper provides a summary and overview of the conference, which was designed to stimulate research and discussion about the consumer perspective on payments. The complete program and materials for the conference can be found on the web at http://www.bos.frb.org/news/conf/payments2005/.
II. An Unusual Conference for Unusual Times
Although the niche topic for the conference was relatively easy to select, the conference format was not. Indeed, consumer payment behavior has not received much attention in the academic research literature in any field, economics or other, nor had it received much attention in the trade or business press before the recent surge in electronic payment usage. Some privatesector participants, such as banks and consulting firms, gather data on consumer payment behavior and conduct analyses to benefit their business practices. But these data and analyses are generally proprietary and not open to detailed scrutiny by the research or public-policy community. In short, there is a need for more explicit, publicly available research and data from all areas related to consumer payment behavior. Check 21 5 , the check can be converted to an electronic image after it has been used for payment.
The consumer can also go online and pay his bill electronically by either credit or ACH, directly at the biller's website or through his bank's online service. NACHA 6 , the electronic payments association, is researching still other alternatives for electronic bill payment. These options, with their different rules and issues of security and identity theft, are examples of why new payment types are creating more confusion for the customer.
Oliver concluded that to address paradoxes in consumer payment behavior, banks must find out what consumers really want. Based on that knowledge, banks can make their investment and product development choices. With that knowledge in hand, they will be able to educate consumers and offer them appropriate incentives and disincentives to facilitate change.
B. Researcher
Stacey Schreft gave a background overview of the economic literature on the consumer side of payment choice. Schreft described what economists have done in this field and what she 3 Automated Clearing House (ACH) is a nationwide batch-oriented electronic funds transfer system that provides for the interbank clearing of electronic debits and credits among two or more participating depository financial institutions. The ACH network is supported both by the Federal Reserve and by private or bank-owned companies. 4 Accounts Receivable Check Conversion (ARC) is the conversion of a paper check, mailed by a consumer to a biller's mailbox, to an ACH payment. 5 Check 21, the Check Clearing for the 21 st Century Act, facilitates check electronification to bring about a more efficient system of check collection processing. Under Check 21, financial institutions can substitute checks using digital images and electronic check information. Check 21 provides the legal framework that legitimizes the creation and use of substitute checks in place of the originals, eliminating the requirement that separate agreements be in place. 6 NACHA, the National Automated Clearing House Association, establishes standards, rules, and procedures that enable participating depository financial institutions located in the United States to exchange ACH payments. Once demand and supply of payment instruments are understood, research could study the choice of which payment instrument to use at the point of sale. Consumer attributes, such as age, income, and education should be incorporated at that stage of research. Lessons from behavioral economics should also be included. Schreft suggested that future research look at dynamic issues-why adoption of some payment technologies is faster than others, why some payment methods disappear and others stay, and how the role of certain payment mechanisms evolves over time. The complexity of the decision-making process warrants collaboration by researchers from several different fields.
Schreft concluded by discussing policy implications of the consumer decision-making process on choice of payment method. Although by her own admission she raised more questions than she answered, her presentation emphasized why more research is needed on how and why consumers choose the payment methods they do.
IV. Filling the Gap in Data on Consumer Payment Behavior
One of the main reasons why the literature on the consumer side of payments is so slim is lack of data. We know very little about consumers' payment decisions because we rarely ask them, as the comments by Rich Oliver indicate. Few good surveys of consumer payment habits exist, and thus there is a need for good data. Belgian consumers in which respondents were asked, over a number of payment methods, whether they had heard of a payment method surveyed, whether they had adopted it, and, if so, how frequently they used it. Respondents were also asked to score payment instruments according to various criteria. 
V. Understanding Consumer Behavior at the Point of Sale

A. Zinman paper
Debit Attinger of VISA notes that cash and check payments account for more than 60 percent of all consumer transactions, with debit transactions rising at a faster pace than credit. So although the "pay now or pay later" mentality may influence consumer payment choices, Attinger contends that the average U.S. consumer household is fairly fiscally conservative, despite what is heard about bankruptcies and rising debt levels.
One consistent driver behind payment choices observed by the panelists is generational influence: Consumers tend to choose the payment method they grew up with. It is common to see the older generation pay with check, the baby boomer generation pay with credit, and the younger generation pay with debit. In addition, Fischer of Wachovia notes that members of the older generation are more likely to be "single-user" customers, while members of the younger generation are more likely to use multiple payment types.
When asked about their POS payment preferences, the panelists' responses varied.
Bouchard of Wal-Mart favors PIN debit, not only because of the resulting speed at checkout, but because of the lower merchant transaction costs compared with credit or signature debit.
Garbarino of Wegmans, on the other hand, prefers an ACH payment product that is paid through Wegmans's loyalty card program, though it has yet to gain the customer acceptance they had hoped for. Fischer suggested that risk aversion may be one cause of the lack of ACH adoption and cautioned that the ACH infrastructure is not as secure as the check infrastructure for fraud and risk mitigation. According to Garbarino, the credit card is the least preferred method of payment, because its use is actually more costly to Wegmans than accepting a paper check.
The financial institution, Wachovia, also selected debit card as the preferred method of payment, although checks still account for approximately half of the firm's primary customer account transactions. Attinger said VISA does not favor one particular payment method. Their priority is to enable as many options as possible so that consumers can choose freely among a robust choice of products. An example is VISA's card-swipe product with no signature requirements, which is quickly being adopted by consumers as an alternative to cash in quickserve restaurant (QSR) environments.
The respondents' opinions on how consumers' payment choices can be influenced at POS were mixed. Bouchard and Garbarino agreed that their options are limited, while Attinger maintains that retailers have a number of possible alternatives. Since they cannot surcharge customers, the retailers believe their most effective option to influence the consumer is to prompt for the consumerʹs PIN-a method currently used by Wal-Mart. However, because of Wegmans's strong customer focus, they choose not to use PIN prompting for two reasons: 1) to avoid confusing the customer at the POS, and 2) to avoid being blamed by the customers for Of the online payments in the United States, 64 percent are paid by credit, 31 percent by debit, and 26 9 percent by PayPal-a non-bank electronic payment method that did not exist eight years ago, yet is being adopted rapidly by consumers, driven by consumers' own needs.
In summary, this panel session provided a unique look into the observations, preferences, and influences related to consumer payment choices. It is evident that each of these industries-retail, financial, and credit card-is intertwined with the others, and that each faces its own challenges. While the means to influence choices may seem limited, the significance of consumers' needs, knowledge, and acceptance of old and new payment methods must not be overlooked.
VI. Filling the Need for Theory
The few research papers that exist on the demand side of payment choice are almost exclusively empirical. So, in addition to the lack of data, there is an even greater Identity theft is an illegal use of personal identifying data-in this case, for credit transactions. On the one hand, consumers want to maintain their privacy and avoid giving out their personal information, while credit providers find monitoring consumers to be costly. On the other hand, fraudulent transactions cannot be prevented without collecting personal financial information. These conflicting objectives generate a trade-off between having and preserving privacy, and this trade-off influences consumer payment decisions. Moreover, the results of the model suggest that technological advances will not eliminate this discomfiting trade-off. On the contrary, the cheaper the technology, the easier it will be to share the information on consumers' identities, and both the positive and the negative effects of this sharing will persist.
Because obtaining information and credit is costly to both consumers and issuers, in the model people form an association similar to a credit-card association like
MasterCard or Visa. The authors call that association a credit club. The credit club has both costs and benefits. One cost-a cost that is primarily, but not entirely, borne by the issuer-is the cost of collecting information when membership decisions are made. On the benefits side, the clubs benefit their participants-both consumers and issuers-by protecting them from identity theft. The more intensive is the screening, the higher the probability of detecting the identity theft, but the higher the cost. 
Discussants:
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Seth Berman discussed the paper. While Kiyotaki focused on the assumptions and structure of the mathematical model, Berman talked about his experiences as a federal prosecutor in charge of computer and Internet crimes.
Kiyotaki affirmed the importance of understanding identity theft and developing sound policies to mitigate it, and he praised the paper for addressing the issue. However, he felt that the paper contained too many versions of its basic model and that these were each too complicated and disconnected. Instead, he proposed a simpler alternative model that boiled down the essential elements of the paper into four equations. In addition, Kiyotaki argued that the credit club developed in the paper acted more like a gift-exchange club than like a lending institution because debtors never repay their debts to their creditors. He also raised questions about the arbitrariness of some of the restrictions imposed on information flows and credit club behavior in the modeling framework.
Berman said his experiences suggest that although entering identity information on the Internet does not seem to increase one's risk of identity theft, there is almost nothing a person can do to prevent that risk. Instead, he suggested that institutions that can do something to raise
Internet security-banks, traders, and credit rating agencies-be made responsible for what they can prevent, so that they incorporate the cost of potential security breach into their decision-making. Otherwise, the costs are not borne by the parties that make decisions, leading to inefficient outcomes. This paper shows that it could be relatively easy for financial institutions or marketing companies to target specific groups of consumers according to their needs. Younger, more affluent households with substantial computer experience are more likely to adopt new technologies than older households who use fewer computer technologies. However, this study also underlines the need for academic researchers to gather more objective data on the adoption and use of different bill-payment technologies. We have to learn more about what determines how consumers pay bills and to understand why they make the choices they do.
VII. Consumer Bill-Payment Behavior
B. Panel Summary
Panelists in this session represented a wide array of businesses and viewpoints on the The panelists offered different points of view on the costs and benefits of allowing customers to pay online using a credit or debit card. Thorell indicated that Comcast allows payment by credit card because of customer demand, even though the costs are higher than for other payment options. Armistead of Bank of America also saw the benefit, but he noted an indirect cost related to the difficulty in implementing online credit-card payments, because billers must adopt a separate mechanism to integrate the process for their customers. Wilson of JPMorgan Chase noticed a large number of debit-card payments for recurring bills.
Another topic discussed was the use of incentives and disincentives to move consumers to online bill payment. Comcast provided opportunity incentives to encourage one type of payment behavior over another. They also charged a small fee to discourage consumers from calling the interactive voice response system (IVR) or a live customer-service representative.
Bank of America employed the tactic of co-marketing with billers to drive customers to the cheaper e-bill payment channel. While successful, Armistead cautioned that one should understand the costs and objectives of marketing programs developed to change consumer payment behavior, because some consumers will adopt a service anyway and don't need incentives. Otherwise, one risks "paying the freight on everybody." JPMorgan Chase took an approach similar to that taken by Comcast. In one example, they allowed consumers making mortgage payments right before the due date to pay via phone instead of FedExing the payment. Chase charged a slightly lower fee than FedEx, which benefited the consumer (who avoided late fees), and also benefited Chase by reducing the number of overnight FedEx payments received all at once for processing. In a second example, after Chase began offering touch-tone and web services for credit-card payments, they raised the fees for talking to a person. Even though Chase quadrupled the fees over time, they continue to have a fair percentage of people willing to pay to talk to someone on the phone. To summarize, the panelists agreed that the use of fees and incentives was an attempt to drive consumers to the most efficient payment channel and not an attempt to steer customers away from the bank, but, despite their efforts, there are still consumers who want to make non-electronic payments and are prepared to pay for the service if necessary.
One interesting phenomenon was the growing use of online bill payment for what the panelists called "nuisance payments" now that the online bill payment service is free. Nuisance payments are non-recurring payments-for example, doctor co-payments. Because they are not electronic throughout, they are more costly for the banks to process. However, Armistead pointed out that while the bank may bear the cost of online banking in general, this cost is offset by a better relationship with customers, increased deposit balances, and lower attrition.
A second phenomenon created from the online bill-payment service is the opportunity consumers now have to make multiple payments via different channels for recurring bills.
Wilson noted that some consumers make multiple payments online during one statement cycle, while others make one payment online and a second payment, tied to the billing statement cycle, via paper check. This increase in the velocity of payments has actually increased the cost of processing.
Finally, the USPS noted that sometimes a shock to the payments system can cause people to behave differently from their usual practice, as they did, for example, after 9/11 and the anthrax scare. Both incidents led to an upsurge in electronic bill payments, initially primarily via automatic deductions (ACH), but then over the next two years trending away from ACH toward more online bill payments.
The panelists predict an eventual flattening of online bill-payment growth. The number of people paying online cannot exceed the number of people who are already using the Internet for other reasons, so it is a subset of that population. As the number of Internet users plateaus, so will the number of users of online bill payment. However, from the USPS's perspective, the gradual erosion of paper payments and concomitant growth in electronic payments to reach that plateau is a painful process 10 because a slow decline in volume is more difficult to deal with than a quick reduction in volume, owing to the need to slowly manage the downturn and gradually move or reduce staff and hours. The USPS is keeping a close watch on volumes through research and surveys.
Overall, the panelists agreed that the online bill-payment process works but that there is 
VIII. The Price of Payments: a Natural Experiment
Although a retailer's costs of processing a transaction vary depending on the payment method used, consumers do not usually face those cost differences explicitly. Therefore, it is difficult to test empirically whether consumers respond to price differences in their payment choices. In "Transforming Payment Choices by Doubling Fees on the Illinois Tollway,"
Amromin, Jankowski, and Porter used a change in the fees for cash versus electronic toll payment on the Illinois Tollway to estimate consumers' response to price differentials across payment methods. One potential implication of a price increase is, of course, a drop in demand. In the case of the Illinois Tollway, the loss in demand was very small with the exception of truck drivers, who changed their driving routes to avoid the Tollway, having faced a much greater increase in price differential than did the drivers of passenger vehicles.
In a sense, this paper represents a combination of the approaches in the other two featured papers: It combines theory with empirical evidence. It presents a theoretical model of payment choice and then tests it using a natural experiment of price differentiation based on the method of payment. Unfortunately, such natural experiments in differentiated prices are rare.
Until the marketplace offers more situations where the price of payment methods varies, we have to continue conducting surveys and asking consumers hypothetical questions about what their responses to differentiated prices would be.
Discussants:
Marc Rysman and Michael Swanson discussed the paper. Rysman commented that the paper would benefit from additional information, such as how many times drivers have to stop to pay tolls, to take into account the effect of time on a driver's decision whether or not to buy I-PASS. Swanson, the chief of operations for the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, talked about the challenge of raising revenues from the Massachusetts Turnpike tolls without raising the tolls so high that drivers will avoid the tollway. Although Massachusetts has not introduced a price differential between cash and electronic tolls, it has tried to provide various incentives to alleviate congestion.
IX. Conclusions
A. Stango
Professor Victor Stango from Dartmouth College summarized the conference. He observed that the conference emphasized the complexity of a consumer's decision how to pay.
For economists, explaining these decisions can be difficult, especially since many consumers seem, according to standard economic models, irrational in their behavior. Consumers base their decisions on many different attributes, and many of these attributes are not easily quantifiable. Taking consumers' preferences into account is important not only for research:
Understanding how people make payment or financial decisions is also important for policy.
Based on the conference panel discussions, Stango concluded that private industry has done a much better job figuring out how consumers make decisions than have economic researchers.
One of the reasons why such decision making is difficult for economists to understand is that consumers make choices based on qualitative characteristics of payments, such as convenience or time, rather than on more easily quantifiable attributes, such as price. However, the conference encouraged Stango to be optimistic that excellent research-some of which was presented at this conference-is taking place and will continue in the future.
B. Emerging Payments Research Group
The EPRG also drew several conclusions from the conference based on an evaluation by participants as well as a critical self-assessment. First, the EPRG was pleased to learn that most participants rated the unique interaction among the academic, industry, and policy communities as favorable and productive. Perhaps not surprisingly, the interaction was not viewed as totally seamless. Some participants wrestled with the technical details of some of the research papers, and other participants felt the panelists should have incorporated the research papers into the discussions better. Nevertheless, all of the sessions were rated favorably overall.
Second, many participants expressed interest in joint ventures that would involve sharing proprietary industry data with researchers in the academic and public sectors. Third, the conference survey was the most highly rated session, which underscored the need and value of collecting consumer payment data. Finally, most participants suggested that the conference should be longer. 
